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Abstract 
This thesis examines the relationship between competitive advantage and stock 
performance. Using Morningstar’s economic moat rating classifications, this paper contributes to 
the competitive advantage literature by providing an empirical assessment of whether wide moat 
stocks, or companies deemed to have sustainable competitive advantages, made for superior 
investments compared to non-wide moat stocks over a ten-year time-frame from 2008 to 2017. 
Additionally, this paper accounts for a previously under-studied topic within the economic moat 
literature by specifically analyzing three sectors and nine industries. The results indicate that 
wide moat stocks surprisingly may not make for a superior stock investment, as the wide moat 
observations in the selected sample were found to have a negative relationship with average 
annual returns (coefficient = -0.05) that was statistically significant at the 5% level. Companies 
with no economic moat, meanwhile, were found to have a positive relationship with average 
annual returns (coefficient = 0.02). Taken together, these results indicate that investment 
research firms such as Morningstar may place excessive weight on wide moat status and thus 
undervalue seemingly less attractive companies that have the potential to offer far higher returns.  
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I.  Introduction 
What makes for a superior investment? According to famed investor and Berkshire 
Hathaway chairman Warren Buffett, one of the keys is to find companies with sustainable 
competitive advantages -- or, in his words, ​wide economic moats​. In a 2007 letter to Berkshire 
Hathaway shareholders, for instance, Buffett had this to say regarding what he believes 
constitutes a successful company:  
“A truly great business must have an enduring “moat” that protects excellent returns on 
invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault 
any business “castle” that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a 
company being the low-cost producer (GEICO, Costco) or possessing a powerful world-wide 
brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, American Express) is essential for sustained success.”  
Buffett’s belief that companies with exploitable edges are successful at withstanding 
competition and, in turn, likely to consistently post strong profits is supported by others in 
academia, as the competitive advantage literature developed by authors such as Harvard 
professor Michael Porter in the early 1980’s includes a number of articles that provide both 
theoretical and empirical support in favor of companies with sustainable competitive advantages. 
This is certainly not an astonishing claim, though. After all, it is apparent that a company with, 
say, unmatched cost advantages (i.e. Walmart) or premier brand prestige (i.e Apple) has little 
trouble out-performing their peers.   1
1 ​This remains true for Walmart and Apple, as each lead their respective industries in a variety of financial metrics 
such as revenue and net income.  
4 
Thus, the ideas espoused by the likes of Buffett and Porter have become more prominent 
in recent years, particularly with respect to investing. In the early 2000’s, for instance, 
Morningstar, a leading investment research firm headquartered in the United States, began to 
formally assess ​economic moats​, which it defines as the likelihood a company can maintain a 
sustainable competitive advantage and thus keep competitors at bay for an extended period of 
time (​Morningstar Investing Glossary​). More specifically, the firm thoroughly assesses a number 
of competitive advantage attributes -- the most notable ones being cost advantages, customer 
switching costs, intangible assets (i.e. brand identity; patents; sustainability measures), network 
effects, and scale advantages -- in order to determine a company’s ability to succeed in both the 
short and long-term.  And since starting this practice, Morningstar has championed its economic 2
moat analysis as a hallmark of its investing philosophy and a crucial determinant of its fair value 
share price recommendations (Lopez, 2003).  
However, there is not a consensus within the economic moat literature supporting the 
notion that wide-moat stocks make for superior investments. While a couple of studies, such as 
Boyd (2005) and Kanuri and McLeod (2016), found evidence indicating that wide moat stocks 
outperform the broader market, Liu and Mantecon (2016) made a compelling case ​against ​wide 
moat stocks, showing that when compared to stocks assigned either ​narrow ​or ​no ​moat ratings 
according to Morningstar,  companies deemed to have limited capabilities actually posted higher 3
average annual stock returns than the distinguished wide moat companies over an eight-year 
sample period. And to add support to their argument, the authors referenced noteworthy studies 
by the likes of Fama and French (1995) that called into question, for instance, the relative 
2 ​These moat attributes will explained further in Section II b) of the literature review.  
3 ​ ​Narrow and no moat ratings, in essence, signify that a company either possesses only a potential source of a 
sustainable competitive advantage (narrow moat) or no source of advantage at all (no moat).  
5 
success of large growth stocks, many of which are widely believed to possess seemingly 
“unbreachable” moats in the words of someone such as Buffett (Morningstar, 2004).  
My thesis contributes to this conversation by empirically assessing Morningstar’s 
economic moat ratings over a ten-year time-frame in order to answer the following research 
question: do wide moat stocks make for a superior investment compared to narrow and no moat 
stocks? My study also examines a relatively under-studied topic within the economic moat 
literature pertaining to possible stock return differences across sectors. I analyze three sectors 
specifically -- technology, healthcare, and consumer defensive -- as well as a number of 
industries within each of these sectors to determine if any differences in stock performance 
relative to moat status arise.  
Surprisingly, my conclusions suggest that wide moat stocks do not necessarily make for a 
superior investment. From 2008-2017, I found that a negative relationship existed between the 
selected wide moat companies in my study and average annual stock returns, as an upgrade from 
non-wide to wide moat status was found to decrease annual stock returns by 5.15%. This 
relationship was also statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, no moat stocks were 
found to be positively related to returns (coefficient = 0.02), suggesting that relative to the 
narrow moat benchmark, no moat stocks yielded roughly 2% higher annual returns. Similar 
conclusions were also found for a majority of the sectors and industries under observation: 
neither the healthcare, consumer defensive, and technology sectors, for instance, reported wide 
moat variable coefficients that were both positive and statistically significant. Taken together, 
my results contribute to the economic moat literature by providing further empirical evidence as 
to the relationship between competitive advantage and stock performance while also adding a 
6 
sector and industry-specific component that had been previously under-studied in the literature. 
Moreover, my findings also relate strongly to conclusions reached by Liu and Mantecon (2016), 
adding further doubt to prevailing investment strategies that advocate in favor of companies with 
sustainable competitive advantages.  
This paper will proceed as follows: Section II provides an in-depth review of the origins 
of the competitive literature as well as a summary of the noteworthy studies related specifically 
to economic moats; Section III discusses methodology and my regression model specifications; 
Section IV contains a breakdown of data sources as well as a brief summary of my data 
collection process; Section V includes a discussion of all noteworthy results; Section VI provides 
an explanation for the reported results, as well as an acknowledgement of my study’s limitations; 
Section VII concludes the paper with suggestions for future research and offers final takeaways.  
 
II.  Literature Review  
One of the fundamental principles in economics is the idea that a firm’s economic profits 
will regress to zero in the long-run after accounting for opportunity costs. Nearly every 
introductory microeconomic textbook examines this trend, particularly with respect to 
monopolistic competition.  And though this theory relies on a number of caveats, such as 4
assuming unrestricted access to markets and using a stricter definition of the term profit,  it is 5
still a common belief that profits will at least trend toward zero as new firms enter successful 
4 ​McEachern (2013), for instance, stated the following in his chapter on monopolistic competition: “Low barriers to 
entry in monopolistic competition mean that short-run economic profit attracts new entrants in the long-run...Entry 
continues in the long-run until economic profit disappears” (pg. 218).  
5 ​In reality, financial profits are used as a measure of performance rather than economic profits, which are difficult 
to truly assess.  
7 
industries. For instance, Stiger (1963) said, “There is no more important proposition in economic 
theory than that, under competition, the rate of return on investment tends toward equality in all 
industries. Entrepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable industries and enter relatively 
profitable industries” (p. 54).  
Recent studies have examined this trend in greater detail. Fama and French (2000), for 
example, assessed whether profitability regresses toward industry averages by compiling a 
cross-sectional dataset with financial information dating from 1964-1995. Using pooled 
time-series regressions inclusive of an annual average of 2,343 firms in their dataset, the authors 
found strong empirical evidence in support of their hypothesis that profitability is 
mean-reverting. They also concluded that mean reversion is stronger when a company’s profits 
are further from its industry’s mean. In other words, when profits are unusually high (or low, for 
that matter), mean-reversion is even more likely to occur.  
Not only are these conclusions in accord with standard economic theory concerning the 
long-term trend of profits, but they have implications with respect to stock investing. Most 
notably, these ideas relate to a fundamental financial economic theory first presented by Eugene 
Fama in 1970 called the ​efficient market hypothesis​, which posited that share prices take into 
account all publically available information, thus decreasing opportunities to construct superior 
portfolios comprised of companies that consistently beat the market.  Although Fama’s 6
hypothesis fails to explain the success of investors such as the aforementioned Buffett, arguably 
the most noteworthy connection between the efficient market hypothesis and the time-series 
trend of profits is that long-term investing success relative to the market is similarly difficult to 
6 ​To clarify: this is the same Fama that co-authored the aforementioned mean-reversion paper along with Kenneth 
French.  
8 
sustain, primarily because it is assumed that all investors are equipped with the same information 
to accurately evaluate companies.  
Important implications also exist as to the role investor responses play with respect to 
both the time-series trend of profits and the efficient market hypothesis. To explain why theories 
such as Fama’s efficient market hypothesis do not necessarily hold true in reality, many financial 
and behavioral economists have explored how investor sentiment affects share prices. Baker and 
Wurgler (2007), for instance, discussed how a number of psychological factors, such as 
availability bias and overconfidence, have been found to dramatically affect stock prices. They 
noted that these implicit biases also vary among investors, resulting in differing reactions as to 
the evaluation of a company’s financial fundamentals. Consequentially, investor awareness may 
influence sentiment toward a company, and therefore influence its stock returns. And as I will 
later discuss with respect to my results, this phenomenon may occur with respect to the stock 
performance of companies considered to be well-positioned to successfully compete in the 
future.  
 
II a)  Michael Porter and the Emergence of Competitive Advantage Literature 
Since no firm would willingly allow their company’s profits to decline, companies began 
investing their energies into combating this profit regression trend. This, in turn, gave rise to the 
competitive advantage literature, which began largely with Michael Porter’s work in the early 
1980’s. Starting with his book ​Competitive Strategy ​(1980), Porter discussed the ways in which 
firms can gain favorable competitive positions in their industry. It is worth mentioning that he 
grounds his arguments by commenting first on the aforementioned mean-reversion tendency in 
9 
profits.  He then introduced a number of important concepts that help assess whether a firm can 7
keep competitors at bay, the most notable one being his “Five-Forces” framework (i.e. the five 
competitive forces that determine industry attractiveness) which continues to be applicable to 
firms looking to implement successful competitive strategies today. In no particular order, these 
forces are: the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, 
the bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry among existing competitors.  
Porter furthered discussed these concepts in one of his next books, ​Competitive 
Advantage ​(1985). ​Advantage ​continued to detail industry-specific views concerning competitive 
positioning while also addressing how a firm might implement and sustain a competitive edge in 
its particular industry. For instance, he augmented his Five Forces framework by stressing the 
importance of firms establishing either a cost advantage or differentiating qualities. Additionally, 
Porter was one of the first in the literature to identify the dynamic nature of competitive 
advantage. In other words, favorable positioning in the present does not guarantee favorable 
positioning moving forward due primarily to what Porter cited is an “unending battle among 
competitors” as well as changes in industry attractiveness. He used Ford Motor Company as an 
example to illustrate this trend, as Henry Ford’s innovative manufacturing techniques in the 
1910’s helped Ford initially dominate the emerging automobile industry before new firms 
entered and adopted similarly advanced production processes in the late ‘20’s, causing Ford’s 
substantial edge to decline.  
Porter’s contribution to the competitive advantage literature has been largely unmatched, 
as numerous other authors, some of whom will be discussed shortly, have cited his framework as 
7 ​As he said on Page 9: “The threat of entry determines the likelihood that new firms will enter an industry and 
compete away the value, either by passing it on to buyers in the form of lower prices or dissipating it by raising the 
costs of competing.” 
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the foundation of their studies. It will also soon be relatively easy to see why Porter’s arguments 
are relevant to this thesis. Economic moat analysis not only expands on Porter’s Five Forces to 
include qualities such as brand identity, intangible assets, and network effects, but it already 
includes factors such as cost advantages and threat of entry.  
One minor critique of Porter’s Five Forces model, however, is that his work may be a bit 
oversimplified and, in turn, outdated given that both ​Strategy ​and ​Advantage ​were originally 
published over thirty years ago.  Moreover, Porter focused entirely on how firms can capture 8
value from consumers. He was not interested in how competitive advantages may affect stock 
performance, which makes his work relatively less relevant to this thesis.  It is also worth 9
mentioning that Porter’s arguments are entirely theoretical, providing future authors an 
opportunity to provide empirical support to his conclusions.  
Nonetheless, the competitive advantage literature divulged into two sections following 
Porter’s publications: industrial organization (IO) and resource-based theories. The latter has 
been analyzed much more frequently in the competitive advantage literature, though, largely 
because it concerns factors within the firm’s control and addresses specific factors that lead to 
competitive advantage. However, before discussing the resource-based literature, it is worth at 
least commenting on the industrial organizational view because it is still essential in forming the 
foundations of the competitive advantage literature. And as it relates to this thesis, it is 
worthwhile to note why the literature has marginalized this theory.  
Unsurprisingly, it was Porter (1981) who summarized the prevailing developments 
concerning IO theories and their impact on strategic management. Unlike his two 
8 ​For instance, he did not offer specific details as to what supplier power entials, nor did he provide nuanced 
suggestions for how a firm can identity and strengthen its authority among other business partners.  
9 ​Granted, it could be argued that delivering superior value can ultimately drive successful stock performance.  
11 
aforementioned works, Porter incorporated literature published by a number of other authors in 
his assessment of IO’s current implications on strategy as well as its possible areas for 
improvement. For instance, he analyzed the Learned, Christensen, Andrew, and Guth (LCAG) 
framework introduced in 1969, which asserted that successful firms must analyze four key 
strategic elements in order to match their strengths with external environmental conditions.  He 10
also commented on the Bain/Mason IO paradigm, which essentially argued that firm 
performance depends largely on its industry environment.  
Porter outlined various reasons why these models have not been widely accepted with 
respect to managerial decisions. For instance, Porter noted how these models, particularly the 
Bain/Mason paradigm, were too rigid in terms of how firms could determine their own fate. As 
he stated: “Traditional IO theory took industry structure as exogenously given, and held that the 
firm’s strategy and performance was fully determined by this structure. Thus the firm was stuck 
with the structure of its industry and had no latitude to alter the state of affairs.” Porter did 
remark, however, that many recent studies attempted to solve these issues -- some with more 
success than others. Nonetheless, he concluded by stating that IO theories provided more 
significant implications regarding political policy than strategic development.  
Powell (1992) is another author who analyzed industry factors and their effect on 
competitive advantage. His paper, which examined the organizational alignments in 
manufacturing industries, is particularly noteworthy because he ultimately concluded that 
industry factors are overrated: external factors, such as industry-wide employment and industry 
10 ​These elements are: 1) company strengths and weaknesses, 2) industry economic and technical 
opportunities/threats,  3) personal values of key implementers, and 4) broader societal expectations.  
12 
stability,  only partly explained what he identified as “supernormal” profits, whereas the 11
firm-specific components included in his empirical analysis, such as a CEO’s influence on 
decision-making, could better explain profitability while holding industry factors constant. Thus, 
Powell concluded that resource-based factors seemed to be more useful in explaining how 
competitive advantage can drive profits. And though Porter continued to rely heavily on IO 
theories in constructing his competitive advantage models outlined in ​Competitive Advantage​, 
these two studies help clarify why the literature began to concentrate on resource-based views.  
Meanwhile, nearly all of the competitive advantage articles related to resource-based 
views (RBV) are grounded in early ideas presented by Wernerfelt (1984). For starters, his paper 
was the first to specifically coin the term ​resource-based view​. His work was also significant 
because he built on Porter’s Five Forces model in order to assess how firms can best utilize their 
resources (which he defined as a firm’s strengths and weaknesses) to achieve higher profitability.  
Additionally, Wernerfelt identified a number of other factors that could theoretically 
contribute to competitive advantage. Some of the most notable with respect to economic moats 
are what he called ​attractive advantages​, which he defined as resources or capabilities that either 
directly or indirectly make it difficult for competitors to successfully compete. He specifically 
noted factors such as machine capacity, or production processes that lead to higher returns to 
scale, which today can be defined more simply as ​scale advantages​. He also identified customer 
loyalty and technological leads as other potential factors. This again relates to economic moat 
factors such as brand identity, which helps drive customer loyalty, and network effects, which 
are often a product of advanced technology. In short, Wernerfelt did a terrific job at further 
11 ​This metric was defined by the author using a report from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s ranking of 
industry stability.  
13 
establishing the theoretical components of competitive advantage. It could also be argued that he 
offered even more insight than Porter: his ideas are more nuanced, as they not only include more 
specific advantage drivers like machine capacity and production experience, but other elements 
such as mergers and acquisitions and other avenues for horizontal and/or vertical integration.  
In a similar vein, Barney (1991) was another key contributor to the emerging RBV 
literature. Barney also incorporated a more firm-specific approach than Porter by discussing the 
impact of specific firm attributes on competitiveness, which was previously an understudied 
topic in the competitive advantage literature. The primary result from Barney’s conclusions is 
that he developed four modified indicators of strategic competitiveness: value, rareness, 
imitability, and sustainability. The four indicators are listed in ascending order of importance. 
For instance, Barney argued that even if a firm produced a rare product, it could not attain a 
competitive advantage unless said product was valuable to consumers. In other words, the firm 
would be able to exploit its edge at producing a rare product if only it is of value to consumers 
first. Similar to Porter, though, Barney did not offer a quantitative investigation, nor a single 
real-world example to support his arguments. Thus, it is difficult to affirm Barney’s theoretical 
conclusions, even if what he argued is logical.  
Fortunately, Newbert (2008) provided some clarity to this matter. He examined the 
prevailing arguments in the resource-based view literature, which he believed relied heavily on 
assumptions, at a conceptual level due to the aforementioned empirical gap. Newbert’s 
hypotheses build on a notion in the RBV literature that resources and capabilities that are 
14 
valuable and/or rare allow firms to gain a competitive advantage.  In turn, the attainment of said 12
advantages will then drive short and long-term financial performance.  
Building largely on work from Barney (1991), Newbert looked specifically at the value 
and rareness of resources in terms of how they drive competitive advantage and, in turn, 
financial performance. He outlined five hypotheses, of which three are particularly relevant to 
this study.  These hypotheses are:  13
 
● Hypothesis 1: The value of the resource-capability combinations that a firm 
exploits will be positively related to its competitive advantage.  
● Hypothesis 2: The rareness of the resource-capability combinations that a firm 
exploits will be positively related to its competitive advantage.  
● Hypothesis 3: A firm’s competitive advantage will be positively related to its 
performance.  
In terms of empirical framework, Newbert responded to a research suggestion by Barney 
and Mackey (2005) by compiling a sample of 664 micro and nanotechnology companies. He 
cited two reasons for choosing this particular group of companies. The first reason connected to 
previous literature by Barney and Mackey arguing that competitive advantages have been most 
difficult to acquire in “dynamic markets,” which he claimed was important for his study because 
he attempted to understand how firms attain competitive advantages rather than maintain them. 
Moreover, he argued that since many of these micro and nanotechnology companies are in their 
12 ​This particular notion is heavily influenced by Barney (1991) and his aforementioned work.  
13 ​Hypotheses 4 & 5 each concern the mediating role competitive advantage has on the relationship between both 
value and the resource-capability and its rareness. This component of the study, in short, is not as relevant as his first 
three hypotheses with respect to this thesis.  
15 
infant stages, it will “offer insights” as to the important mediating role of competitive advantage 
outlined in hypotheses 4 & 5. Newbert’s explanations for choosing micro and nanotechnology 
companies, however, are confusing, partly because he did not provide a definition of dynamic 
markets.  Combined with his small survey timespan from the fall of 2003 to the spring of 2004, 14
Newbert’s initial explanation of his data choices falls short.  
His study also suffered from flawed methodology choices. In order to compile data 
regarding a firm’s value and rareness, Newbert issued surveys to senior-level executives of all 
664 companies. This method called for executives to subjectively assess the value and rareness 
of their companies’ own resources and capabilities. Though the author attempted to reduce the 
potential for bias by adjusting the framing of questions in order to indirectly assess these 
competitive advantage indicators, the drawbacks of this approach remain obvious with respect to 
response bias.  
Regardless, Newbert compiled hundreds of responses and attributed scores reflecting 
factors such as the firm’s success at reducing costs.  He then summarized this data to generate 15
composite scores for the three categories in his study -- value, rareness, and competitive 
advantage -- and compared those results to various financial performance measures.  Using 16
hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to test his five hypotheses, Newbert 
ultimately found support for the three hypotheses mentioned above. In other words, he concluded 
that both value and rareness are positively related to competitive advantage, while competitive 
14 ​He cited previous literature with respect to this definition, inferring that one must review other articles to gain 
further understanding.  
15 ​This is one measure he cited for how a firm derives value.  
16 ​His financial performance data, for the record, was also gathered using these surveys. However, this choice was 
not as questionable because a) he incorporated various objective metrics (such as revenue and operating margin) and 
b) these subjective measures had been used frequently in previous literature.  
16 
advantage is indeed positively correlated with performance. Thus, despite the study’s numerous 
shortcomings, Newbert confirmed that RBV hypotheses are now no longer entirely based on 
assumptions.  
 
II b)  Competitive Advantage and Stock Performance: The Rise of Economic Moats 
Arguably the main shortcoming of the aforementioned studies with respect to this thesis 
is that they did not analyze the relationship between competitive advantage and stock 
performance. In fact, this area of concentration within the competitive literature has only been 
examined by a few authors such as Gjerde et al. (2010). Their study contributed to the 
conversation by introducing a method for which competitive advantage can be measured as a 
single-variable in order to determine whether resource-based or industry-based competitive 
advantage is more responsible for abnormal stock performance.  
The authors’ attempt to categorize the two types of competitive advantage is particularly 
noteworthy. Their method stated that industry-based advantages were earned if return on equity 
capital was larger than the average cost of equity capital determined by the capital market. 
Resource-based advantages, meanwhile, were classified based on whether a firm had a cost of 
equity capital below the industry’s average cost of equity capital. However, though their 
definition of industry-based advantage is reasonable considering it is in accord with a 
widely-accepted definition used by Barney (2007), their methodology for determining 
resource-based advantages is questionable because it has no precedent in the literature. It also 
lacked details such as value and rareness that, as mentioned by Barney (1991), have been found 
to drive resource-based advantages.  
17 
One strength of this study’s data and methodology, though, is that it included a 
significant sample of companies. The authors’ data included 3,051 firm-year observations from 
1986-2005 of an assortment of publicly-traded Norwegian companies.  The large time-frame 17
and variety of companies help add support to this study’s conclusions. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the authors used binary correlation coefficients and 
multiple OLS regressions to confirm that the two sources of competitive advantage related 
positively to abnormal stock performance. However, these results were only statistically 
significant for resource-based competitive advantages, which they found to be significant at the 
1% level. Industry-based competitive advantage, on the other hand, was not found to be 
statistically significant even at the 10% level. Furthermore, the authors performed numerous 
robustness tests, such as splitting the 20-year period into smaller time interval sections, and still 
came to the same conclusions, which lends further credence to their support of resource-based 
competitive advantages as a contributing factor to superior stock performance.  
Other studies, meanwhile, have analyzed the relationship between specific competitive 
advantage attributes, such as the four outlined by Barney (1991), and stock performance.  18
Arguably the most notable one to be studied recently is sustainability. Kruger (2015), for 
instance, analyzed how the markets responded to events related to corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Using a uniquely constructed dataset of 2,116 CSR events from 2001 to 2007, he found 
that investors reacted negatively following both negative and positive events, although the 
reaction was far stronger for negative events. Nonetheless, the latter conclusion concerning 
negative reactions to seemingly positive developments is still surprising, but Kruger reasoned 
17 ​All companies were listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
18 ​Recall that the four attributes outlined by Barney were value, rareness, imitability, and sustainability.  
18 
that stock investors likely think negatively of CSR initiatives regardless if they are deemed to be 
a positive event.   19
One of the strengths of Kruger’s paper is his effort to account for endogeneity issues. As 
he explained with respect to previous studies investigating CSR’s effect on stock performance, 
the observance of a positive relationship between the variables can be interpreted in two different 
ways: socially responsible firms may earn higher profits or perhaps firms that earn higher profits 
are more likely, in turn, to be socially responsible. Kruger accounts for this potential reverse 
causality issue, though, by using an event study to measure short-term changes in shareholder 
value.  
However, given the challenges in identifying observable events related to other 
competitive advantage attributes,  potential endogeneity issues still exist with respect to the 20
relationship between competitive advantage and stock performance and are thus a possible 
reason why this relationship has been relatively understudied.  Another reason is that 21
competitive advantages are difficult to examine empirically. After all, there is hardly an 
objective technique for measuring competitive advantage -- and those that have used a 
quantitative procedure to measure it, such as Gjerde et al (2010), made questionable decisions 
concerning their definitions because some of their methods had not been supported by past 
literature.  
19 ​This makes sense theoretically because CSR initiatives tend to be rather costly.  
20 ​In other words, the difficulty in determining what constitutes a competitive advantage “event study” has likely 
deterred scholars away from this subject. Perhaps a news headline such as “Apple’s brand identity recently named 
number one among S&P 500 companies” could constitute as an intangible asset event, but the precise specifics of 
these sort of measurements obviously would need further clarification. This gap in the competitive advantage 
literature, however, will be discussed further in this paper’s conclusion.  
21 ​Scholars, in short, have yet to confirm whether competitive advantages may drive superior stock performance, or 
whether superior stock performance actually may lead to competitive advantages.  
19 
More recently, however, a new term for competitive advantage -- economic moat -- has 
emerged in the financial world and assisted in this dilemma. The term was first coined by famed 
investor and Berkshire Hathaway chairman Warren Buffett, who in his annual letters to 
shareholders would continuously reference firms with “economic castles protected by 
unbreachable moats” as one of the primary factors he looks for in a profitable investment 
(Morningstar 2004). Due largely to Buffett’s investing success,  many investment and 22
investment research firms have recently popularized this strategy predicated around finding 
companies with economic moats.  
The most notable example is undoubtedly Morningstar, an independent investment 
research firm whose platforms are widely used by other companies in the financial services 
industry.  Morningstar goes to great lengths to assess the strength of a firm’s economic moat. 23
The firm provides in-depth analyst reports, for instance, on over 1,000 publicly-traded 
companies; and in each of these reports, a section is devoted to assigning and explaining the 
particular company’s economic moat rating. More specifically, Morningstar’s committee of 
senior researchers uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors to assess the specific 
attributes that determine a company’s economic moat rating. The five main attributes it analyzes, 
as stated in its investing glossary, are as follows: 
 
 
22 ​Berkshire Hathaway’s market capitalization is close to $500 billion. Buffett also reportedly has a net worth of 
over $80 billion.  
23 ​Morgan Stanley, for instance, relies heavily on Morningstar’s analysis when preparing stock and ETF reports for 
clients. 
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Moat Attribute Explanation Example 
Cost advantage Any structural advantage that 
enables firms to reduce costs and/or 
charge lower prices 
McDonald’s​ sells cheeseburgers 
for as little as $1, far below the cost 
of a burger at many other 
restaurants 
Efficient scale When a market is effectively served 
by only one or a small number of 
companies; usually occurs when 
market has high barriers to entry.  
Morningstar cites energy companies 
such as ​Enterprise Products 
Partners​ that have natural 
geographic monopolies that are 
essentially unbreachable by 
competitors as noteworthy 
examples.  
Intangible assets Includes patents, brand identity, 
corporate sustainability initiatives, 
company culture, and any other 
intangible factor that contributes to 
a firm’s ability to charge a premium 
price or prevent competitors from 
duplicating the success of a 
company’s product or service. 
Apple’s​ strong brand identity -- it 
was ranked as the world’s #1 global 
brand by Interbrand in 2017 -- 
drives profits for the iPhone, which 
contributes to superior performance 
over the likes of Samsung.  
Network effects Occurs when value of a platform or 
service increases as more 
consumers and/or sellers join.  
eBay​ becomes more valuable as 
more buyers search for products on 
the site, which incentivizes more 
sellers of products to list their 
items.  
Switching costs How easy is it for a customer to 
switch to a competitor’s product? 
An airline that secures a contract 
with an airplane producer like 
Boeing​, for instance, is likely 
locked in to paying billions for 
planes over a number of years. 
 
It should be noted that these five attributes are not necessarily the only ways in which a 
firm can achieve an economic moat. Other variables, such as government assistance for a large 
aerospace & defense company like Boeing, could be another source of competitive advantage. 
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Moreover, as mentioned above, Morningstar’s economic moat assessments are both qualitative 
and quantitative in nature. With respect to the latter, the firm’s researchers analyze metrics such 
as the spread between a company’s return on invested capital (ROIC) and its cost of capital. It 
also compares other key ratios, such as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA), 
across companies to assess whether a company has held a dominant position in its industry 
(Morningstar Indexes Yearbook).  However, these evaluations do not employ advanced 24
econometric techniques,  as Morningstar’s analyst reports not only tend to use rather 25
unadvanced quantitative metrics, but these metrics oftentimes are referenced in order to support 
the analyst’s largely qualitative argument.   26
Nonetheless, Morningstar’s adoption of this strategy has allowed for a number of 
possible breakthroughs regarding the further study of competitive advantage with respect to 
stock performance. For starters, the attributes used to assess economic moat ratings are grounded 
in often-cited and heavily supported work by the likes of Porter (1980, 1985) and Barney (1991). 
Moreover, economic moat ratings help solve issues that plagued the likes of Newbert (2008) and 
Gjorde et al. (2010) concerning how those authors defined competitive advantage. Whereas those 
authors relied on faulty assumptions when determining their single-variable metrics, Morningstar 
relies on objective analyst assessments that incorporate a number of quantitative and qualitative 
factors.  27
24 ​With respect to ROE, for example, Morningstar prefers companies to have a figure above 20% in order to be 
deemed a wide moat company.  
25 ​ For example, I have seen analyst reports in which the analyst will cite a company’s ranking on Interbrand's brand 
identity power rankings in order to argue that it has a recognizable brand.  
26 ​See Appendix, Table 12 for a diagram that further illustrates Morningstar’s moat rating process.  
27 ​It is likely that these analyst reports are trustworthy due to the fact that Morningstar is one of the most popular 
investment research firms and is currently relied upon by major financial service firms like Morgan Stanley.  
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Moreover, Morningstar’s moat ratings also allow for easier classification between firms 
deemed to have sustainable and unsustainable competitive advantages. Those with sustainable 
competitive advantages are classified as “wide moat” firms. Those with either flimsy advantages 
or competitive advantages that are not necessarily sustainable moving forward are classified as 
“narrow moat” firms. Those with no competitive advantages to speak of at all are classified as 
“no moat” firms. These classifications are vital to this thesis, as they allow for a simpler, and 
perhaps even more accurate framework, to identify competitive advantage and track subsequent 
stock performance.  
Additionally, there is an important time component to the evaluation of economic moats 
worth mentioning as well. The dynamic nature of competition as described by Porter (1980) 
means a company’s moat status could be wide one year and narrow the next. Thus, Morningstar 
updates its analyst reports on a three to six month basis and, if necessary, revises its economic 
moat classifications.  
 
II c)  Studies Evaluating the Success of Wide Moat Firms  
Given the abundance of theoretical, rather than empirical, studies evaluating competitive 
advantage discussed previously, the question then becomes whether the same is true for the 
economic moat literature: have authors studied whether wide moat firms actually achieve 
superior stock market performance? In short, the literature is also relatively thin with respect to 
studies that empirically assess the success of wide moat firms.  
Granted, there are a few obvious reasons why this is the case. For starters, Morningstar 
did not fully embrace economic moats as part of its investing philosophy until the early 2000’s. 
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The firm also did not begin to formally include economic moat analysis as part of each analyst 
report until roughly 2002. Morningstar’s archives, in turn, do not provide a very long time-frame 
in order to empirically assess the long-term merits of this strategy. Moreover, perhaps 
pre-conceived notions play a role as well. Other authors in the competitive advantage literature, 
for instance, seemed to take for granted that ideas such as Porter’s Five Forces and Barney’s 
drivers of competitive advantage would naturally lead to superior financial and/or stock 
performance if a firm possessed such advantages. However, this assertion fails to thoroughly 
account for issues such as endogeneity.  
Nonetheless, with respect to the economic moat literature, surprisingly there is ​not​ a 
consensus concerning whether wide moat firms make for superior investments. But before 
assessing the study that throws Morningstar’s investing philosophy into question, I will first 
discuss Boyd (2005) because he was one of the first authors to formally use Morningstar’s 
economic moat ratings in a study testing Buffett and Morningstar’s “intuitively appealing” 
premise that wide moat stocks make for superior investments. In addition to examining the stock 
performance of large and mid-cap companies with wide moats from 2000 to 2004, the author 
was interested in confirming both Buffett and Morningstar’s claim that companies with 
sustainable competitive advantages follow an upward earnings trajectory.  Boyd claimed to find 28
support for both of his hypotheses. Wide moat firms did achieve superior stock performance 
based on Value Line’s measure of price growth persistence and Boyd argued that there was also 
evidence that these stocks had positive earnings stability.   29
28 ​These wide moat large-cap stocks, for the record, are known as Morningstar’s Bellwether 50.  
29 ​Value Line’s model, in short, assesses share price growth compared to the growth of an average stock. According 
to Boyd, these persistence ratings “range from 100 (highest) to 5 (lowest)” (51).  
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However, a notable shortcoming of this study is its surprising lack of empirical support. 
In other words, Boyd essentially argued that since these stocks appeared to sustain their earnings 
per share figures, as well as the fact that 39 of the 50 wide moat large-cap stocks in 
Morningstar’s Bellwether 50 noticeably outperformed the market, wide moat stocks therefore 
deliver superior returns. While not necessarily wrong, this evidence alone is not entirely 
convincing because it does not feature a regression model, nor does it account for possible 
control variables such as the overall performance of the market.  
Kanuri and McLeod (2016), however, provided a stronger case for wide moat stocks. 
Their study analyzed whether wide moat companies deliver superior returns relative to two 
standard benchmark indices: the S&P 500 and Russell 3000. The authors used Morningstar’s 
moat classification system to assemble an initial portfolio of wide moat stocks starting in 2002, 
which they continuously updated until 2014 as Morningstar reevaluated its moat ratings. Kanuri 
and McLeod then gathered a variety of risk-adjusted performance (RAP) measures, such as 
Sharpe and Sortino ratios, to thoroughly assess the performance of the portfolios on a monthly 
and yearly basis. The authors ultimately concluded that the wide moat stocks had higher returns 
relative to the two indices even while adjusting for risk. These returns were also statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
This study had a few noteworthy elements that not only added merit to the authors’ 
conclusions, but have particular relevance with regard to this thesis. First, in contrast to Boyd, 
who examined only a five-year dataset, Kanuri and McLeod constructed annual portfolios of 
wide moat companies over a 12-year period. This longer time-frame (June 2002 to May 2014) is 
less prone to selection bias, as it encompassed both the years before and after the Great 
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Recession of 2007-08. The twelve-year period also allowed for a better assessment of 
Morningstar’s buy-and-hold strategy for these wide moat companies.  
Additionally, the study offered a variety of other conclusions that are far more nuanced 
than a study such as Boyd’s. For instance, the authors found that the wide moat portfolio had a 
higher aggregate Sharpe ratio,  which suggested that the wide moat portfolio compensated 30
investors better relative to the risk method. They also reported a higher Sortino ratio, which 
indicated that the wide moat portfolio was less likely to incur heavy losses.  Moreover, their 31
results were strengthened by other robustness checks which factored in models such as Carhart’s 
Four Factor Model (1997), which adjusts for “momentum,” or previous acceleration in share 
growth over the previous twelve months. The authors also included a separate model which only 
examined data during the Great Recession from 2007-2009. In both cases, support for their 
conclusions was strengthened.  32
One notable shortcoming of Kanuri and McLeod’s study, though, was that they did not 
compare the stock performance of wide moat firms in relation to narrow and/or no moat firms. In 
theory, such an analysis could provide even more support for wide moat stock investing because 
it could prove if wide moat stocks not only outperform the market, but if they outperform 
portfolios comprised largely of narrow and no moat stocks as well. 
However, as mentioned earlier, there is ​not ​a consensus in the economic moat literature: a 
recent study by Liu and Mantecon (2016) that compared the stock performance of wide moat 
30 ​More formally, the authors explained that Sharpe ratio “evaluates how well an investment compensates its 
investor for each unit of risk incurred.”  
31 ​As stated by the authors, “a large Sortino Ratio indicates low risk of large losses occurring.”  
32 ​In the case of the Great Recession dataset, for instance, the authors found that while the wide moat stocks posted 
only a -2.62% average monthly return, this portfolio still outperformed the S&P 500 (-3.15%) and Russell 3000 
(also -3.15%).  
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firms versus narrow and no moat firms surprisingly found that firms with ​no ​ economic moat 
outperformed those with wide moats. In other words, firms with absolutely no evidence of a 
sustainable competitive advantage somehow outperformed companies that an investor like 
Buffett would praise for having “unbreachable moats” (Morningstar, 2004).  
On the surface, this conclusion does not make much sense; but from an empirical 
perspective, the authors’ case was fairly convincing. After assembling annual portfolios of stocks 
based on whether Morningstar assigned a wide, narrow, or no moat rating, the authors found that 
no moat portfolios outperformed the wide moat portfolios by an average of 7% annually.  33
However, when they included a larger variety of controlling variables into their Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) regression model , this conclusion was not found to be statistically significant 34
even at the 10% level.  
Thus, the authors then decided to expand the time-frame of their study in order to 
decrease the likelihood of sampling bias. One problem, though, was that Morningstar’s moat 
ratings only dated back to the 2000’s, so Liu and Mantecon made the ambitious choice to study 
the determinants of moat rating and constructed a quasi-predictive framework for moat status 
that could theoretically allow them to assess competitive advantage dating back to 1964.  Again, 35
this was an ambitious choice, but the larger time span strengthened the authors’ conclusions, as 
no moat firms again outperformed wide moat firms.  36
33 ​Narrow moat firms, for the record, also outperformed wide moat firms, but this result was only based on the 
authors’ summary statistic table. For some reason, the authors did not include narrow moat firms into their 
regressions -- they exclusively studied the performance of wide moat versus no moat firms.  
34 ​Variables included size, book-to-market ratios, beta, earnings yield, and financial leverage.  
35 ​In other words, the authors assessed the likelihood that firms with, say, a larger market capitalization received a 
wide moat rating and extrapolated those probabilities across a variety of companies in order to construct a large 
dataset from 1964-2011.  
36 ​These results were also statistically significant based on the authors’ Fama-MacBeth regressions, although they 
were significant at only the 10% level.  
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Empirical results aside, the intuitive case explaining why no moat firms outperformed 
wide moat firms in terms of stock performance is also compelling. The authors mentioned, for 
instance, that even if a firm has a competitive advantage, this advantage may already be factored 
into the share price. This idea relates strongly to the aforementioned efficient market hypothesis, 
which posited that share prices take into account all publically available information, thus 
decreasing opportunities to find companies that consistently beat the market.  
Moreover, the authors also asserted that wide moat stocks were far more stable than no 
moat stocks, as the median annual return for wide moat firms was significantly higher than no 
moat firms (8.0% vs -2.7%). To explain why no moat firms performed better overall, the authors 
presented evidence relating to how the no moat stock portfolios were driven by a few extreme 
examples: only eight firms, for instance, experienced exceptional stock growth higher than 1,000 
percent over the sample period. Unsurprisingly, all eight of these firms were no moat stocks.  
Furthermore, the authors found that the wide moat portfolios were mostly comprised of 
large growth stocks.  Liu and Mantecon cited empirical evidence in their literature review 37
arguing that large stocks tend to have lower annual stock returns, while other studies, such as 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995), attest to the profitability of value stocks 
over growth stocks.  Lakonishok et al, for instance, found evidence of mean-reversion and lower 38
returns for growth stocks compared to value stocks. In other words, even though the growth 
firms in their sample had superior financial numbers than the value firms, higher expectations for 
future growth rates combined with profits gradually regressing to the industry mean suggested 
37 ​94% of the wide moat stocks in their portfolios, for instance, had large market capitalizations. Another 74% were 
growth stocks, which was markedly higher than the percentage of growth stocks in the no moat portfolios (34%).  
38 ​Value stocks, in short, refer to companies whose shares are trading below market level. These companies, as Liu 
and Mantecon state, tend to have weaker fundamentals, such as high book-to-market ratios. Growth stocks, in 
contrast, refer essentially to expensive stocks, or stocks that are value more highly by the market.  
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that value stocks actually made for the better investment. Fama and French, meanwhile, came to 
a similar conclusion, suggesting that over the course of a 22-year sample, value stocks had 
higher monthly growth rates than growth stocks despite the latter group including far more 
popular companies as evidenced by ratios such as price/earnings (P/E).  
 
II d)  Summary  
To relate this discussion back to the introduction of my literature review, Liu and 
Mantecon (2016) arrived at these surprising conclusions despite also proving in another 
component of their study that wide moat stocks were far less likely to experience mean-reverting 
tendencies, such as declining profit margins and return on equity. So how can one further explain 
the underperformance of wide moat stocks despite these companies exhibiting characteristics of 
sustainable performance, as predicted by the likes of Buffett and Morningstar?  
In short, the results of this paper pose a number of questions related to the competitive 
advantage literature, specifically with respect to whether firms that possess sustainable 
advantages outperform those without such competitive abilities in the stock market. As 
mentioned previously, the competitive literature originally developed by the likes of Porter 
(1980, 1985) and Barney (1991) seemed to reach a consensus regarding whether a firm that 
successfully produced products or services that were viewed as valuable, rare, or inexpensive 
achieved superior financial performance. Empirical studies, such as Newbert (2008), reached this 
conclusion as well.  
There is not a clear consensus with respect to stock performance, though, based on Liu 
and Mantecon’s paper. Their results throw investing philosophies from the likes of Morningstar 
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into question, although it is important to remember the conclusions reached by Gjerde et al. 
(2010), Boyd (2005), and Kanuri and McLeod (2016) supported investing strategies predicated 
around wide moat stocks. Still, Liu and Mantecon’s argument that wide moat stocks may be 
overrated is not without merit based on widely-accepted literature presented by Fama (1970), 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), and Fama and French (1995).  
Therefore, this thesis will add clarity to the conversation by assessing the relationship 
between economic moats and stock performance. More specifically, this study will provide 
empirical evidence based on an assessment of Morningstar’s economic moat ratings over a 
ten-year stretch (2008 to 2017) in order to answer the following research question: do wide moat 
stocks make for a superior investment compared to narrow and no moat stocks? Additionally, 
while most of the competitive advantage literature has paid particular attention to resource-based 
advantages as a driver of firm performance, my thesis will focus on sector and industry-related 
factors, which have been largely neglected by the literature yet may be more relevant in terms of 
explaining stock performance than previously thought.  
While the precise empirical relationship between wide moat companies and stock 
performance may be ambiguous based on Liu and Mantecon’s conclusions, my hypothesis is that 
wide moat stocks will generate higher returns than non-wide stocks in all facets of my empirical 
analysis. This expectation is based on the abundance of theoretical papers published by the likes 
of Porter (1980, 1985) and Barney (1991), as well as the moat-specific studies by authors such as 
Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005), that have confirmed the importance of competitive 
advantage.  
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But as Liu and Mantecon (2016) proved in their paper, perhaps such information is 
already priced into the stock market -- and perhaps the investment strategies hailed by firms such 
as Morningstar place excessive weight on wide economic moats. The empirical ambiguity with 
respect to this hypothesis, therefore, means that it is possible I will find unexpected signs with 
respect to my primary hypothesis. The following sections describing the methodology and results 
from my study will determine if that is the case.  
 
III.  Methodology 
Building largely on methodology used by Liu and Mantecon (2016), my empirical model 
will feature competitive advantage (i.e. economic moat status) as the study’s primary 
independent variable in order to analyze whether competitive advantage contributes to superior 
stock market performance. More specifically, economic moat status will be factored into a 
regression model that includes a number of company-specific dependent variables, such as 
annual stock returns and annual stock returns relative to overall market performance, designed to 
assess whether wide moat stocks make for particularly profitable investments compared to 
companies designated as having narrow or no economic moats. Thus, my study differs from 
Boyd (2005) and Kanuri and McLeod (2016), whose papers focused specifically on wide moat 
firms and whether they outperform the market, and is most similar to Liu and Mantecon (2016). 
The latter study included companies categorized under each of Morningstar’s moat 
classifications in an effort to assess whether wide moat stocks outperformed narrow and no moat 
stocks. My thesis will do the same.  
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Another component of their study that I will emulate is how the authors first discussed 
general comparisons regarding the sample’s annual portfolio performance of wide, narrow, and 
no moat stocks. Since their results showed that wide moat stocks had both lower raw and 
market-adjusted returns, the regression models became even more consequential in terms of 
further detailing the relationship between economic moats and stock performance. Moreover, the 
authors included a wide range of control variables, such as market capitalization, book-to-market 
ratio, and price-to-earnings ratio, that have been used previously in the financial economic 
literature by the likes of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1993). My study will 
follow the same strategy as Liu and Mantecon by including the following company-specific 
control variables in order to further explain differences in stock performance: market 
capitalization, price-to-book, and price-to-earnings. I will explain why I selected these particular 
variables shortly.  
The main difference between my study and Liu and Mantecon (2016), however, is with 
respect to how I will segment the stock portfolios. Whereas their study only classified the 
companies in their annual portfolios based on moat status, I will also classify my portfolios by 
sector because sector-related factors are an understudied topic within the economic moat 
literature as it relates to stock performance. In other words, I will determine whether competitive 
advantage is a greater influence on stock performance in certain sectors rather than others by 
running separate regressions for stocks in the technology, consumer defensive, and healthcare 
sectors. Moreover, I will also examine whether any significant results arise from running 
separate regressions based on specific industries within each of the aforementioned sectors. Nine 
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industries qualified for inclusion in this component of the study based on imposed sample size 
requirements.  A list of these nine industries can be found in Table 1 of the Appendix.  39
The three sectors that are included in this dataset, however, were chosen for a few 
reasons. For starters, after segmenting companies by sector through Morningstar’s premium 
stock screener, the three selected sectors had the largest sample of companies that fit all of my 
requisite data requirements (more on data qualifications in Section IV). In addition, each of these 
sectors possibly feature industry-specific effects that may make moat status more valuable in 
certain industries. Many companies in the technology sector, for instance, are known to have 
wild fluctuations in share prices, as evidenced by the Dot Com bubble in the early 2000’s. 
Perhaps this pressure to consistently produce innovative products makes the industry more 
volatile, and moat status, in turn, less secure. The healthcare industry, in contrast, appears to be 
more stable: citizens are in constant need of healthcare; there are usually high start-up and 
research & development costs to enter the industry; and government programs often provide 
these companies assistance, which possibly ensures that many of these firms have the 
opportunity to post consistent profits. Sustaining a competitive advantage in the healthcare 
sector, in short, appears to more feasible. Furthermore, it could be argued that the consumer 
defensive sector serves as a benchmark for economic moat’s effect on performance compared to 
the other two sectors, as many consumer defensive companies, such as Johnson & Johnson, 
produce products that are often difficult to differentiate in terms of value. Thus, perhaps moat 
status is less likely to be an influence on returns in this sector, whereas it could potentially have a 
greater effect on companies competing in the technology and healthcare sectors.  
39 ​I required a minimum of 70 annual observations for inclusion. Thus, many industries were dropped due to not 
having a preferable number of observations. Others were also excluded due to collinearity issues in their respective 
regressions.  
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III a)  Model Specifications 
I estimate my main regressions using fixed effects. My formulas are as follows:  
1) eturn W ide No Narrow MarketCap P B P ER it = βo + β1 it + β2 it + β3 it + β4 it + β5 it + β6 it + τ t + θi + εit  
2) djReturn W ide No Narrow MarketCap P B P EA it = βo + β1 it + β2 it + β3 it + β4 it + β5 it + β6 it + τ t + θi + εit  
The first dependent variable -- -- represents average annual stock return for stocketurnR it  
 in year , while  accounts for returns relative to the annual performance of thei t djReturnA it  
broader market for stock  in year . The three moat status dummy variables are the primaryi t  
independent variables under observation.  segments wide moat stocks from non-wideideW it  
moat stocks (Wide = 1; Non-Wide = 0).  segments no moat stocks from wide and narrowoN it  
moat stocks (None = 1; Wide and Narrow = 0).  segments narrow moat stocks fromarrowN it  
wide and no moat stocks (Narrow = 1; Wide and None = 0). The first two dummy variables will 
be particularly insightful with respect to my study’s results because they better isolate the 
performance of stocks based on moat status.  Thus,  will serve as a benchmark forarrowN it  
40
comparison between and . Moreover, this decision to use dummy variables for moatideW it oN it  
status in order to eliminate any categorical effects that may have hindered the assessment of 
whether moat status is related to stock performance also follows the same regression framework 
utilized by Liu and Mantecon (2016). 
My hypothesis for  is that it will be positively related to both andideW it eturnR it  
. In contrast, my hypothesis for  is that it will be negatively related to thedjReturnA it oN it  
40 ​In other words, I will be able to more accurately determine whether wide moat stock returns were superior over 
the selected sample period based on the wide moat dummy variable coefficients as opposed to the narrow moat 
variable because the latter lumps together wide and no moat stocks, which are each inherently disparate.  
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dependent variables. As mentioned previously, however, the relationship between these variables 
is empirically ambiguous based on the conflict in the economic moat literature. Therefore, it is 
possible that the regression results will yield unexpected signs. 
Moreover, I control for yearly variation over the ten-year sample by treating  as a timeτ t  
fixed effects variable, while  represents my model’s company fixed effects variable. Inθi  
addition, my model has three other control variables: , , and .arketCapM it BP it EP it  
 represents each company’s annual market capitalization.  stands forarketCapM ii BP ii  
Price/Book ratio, while  is Price/Earnings. These two variables were also observed at theEP it  
yearly level for each company observation; and taken together, these three control variables were 
included largely because they were incorporated into the regression model used by Liu and 
Mantecon (2016).  Furthermore, though this thesis is focused on moat status’ relationship to 41
stock returns, I expect positive signs for each of the three control variables based largely on 
conclusions reached by Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995). However, my 
hypothesis for the magnitude of each of these coefficients is ambiguous because these particular 
relationships have not been previously analyzed in the literature.  
In addition, these independent variables are also included in my additional regressions 
which assess the relationship between moat status and returns for each of the three sectors 
included in my dataset, as well as specific industries within those sectors. The three sectors, as 
mentioned, are consumer defensive, healthcare, and technology. The nine industries are as 
41 ​Due to data collection constraints, I could not factor in all five control variables used by those authors, though.# 
This is not a huge concern, however, because I still include three of the components used by Liu and Mantecon 
(2016), although there is a slight difference with respect to my inclusion of Price/Book ratio, as the aforementioned 
authors used a slightly different equation: Book-to-Market ratio. Since I did not have access to Book-to-Market 
ratios over the ten-year period, I used Price/Book ratio as an alternative measure. 
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follows: alcoholic beverages, biotechnology, drug manufacturers, health care plans, household & 
personal products, information technology, medical instruments, semiconductors, and software.  
Similar to my primary regression measuring whether  is positively related toideW it  
 across all observations included in the dataset, I also expect that for each sector andeturnR it  
industry there will be a positive relationship between wide moat stocks and annual returns and a 
negative relationship between no moat stocks and annual returns. However, I anticipate that the 
degree to which competitive advantage relates positively to stock performance will differ with 
respect to certain sectors and industries. As mentioned earlier, I theorize that wide moat status 
will be easier to maintain for companies in the healthcare sector as opposed to the technology 
sector, for instance. It is reasonable to infer, therefore, that if a company is more likely to 
maintain its wide moat rating, it would also be more likely to consistently generate superior stock 
returns. Thus, I expect the coefficients to be highest for the healthcare regression and lowest for 
the technology regression.   42
Additionally, I expect these effects to relate strongly to the industry-specific regressions. 
In other words, since I expect to see a higher coefficient for the healthcare regression, I also 
anticipate seeing similar signs for the four healthcare industries under observation.  It is worth 43
mentioning, however, that since this sector and industry-specific component of my thesis has 
been under-studied in the economic moat literature, these particular hypotheses are based largely 
on my intuition rather than previous theories presented by other authors. Moreover, with respect 
to no moat stocks, I also expect a negative relationship between  and  for eachoN it eturnR it  
42 I expect the consumer defensive sector, in short, to split the difference.  
43 ​As shown in Table 13 in the Appendix , these four industries are: Biotechnology, Drug Manufacturers, Health 
Care Plans, and Medical Instruments.  
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sector and industry akin to my hypothesis for the no moat dummy variable in my primary 
regressions. Due to the lack of attention on sector and industry differences in the economic moat 
literature, though, the magnitude of these negative relationships by sector and industry is 
ambiguous.  
Lastly, my thesis also includes two additional empirical specifications that will add 
further insight to my research question. First, I created lag variables for each of the three moat 
dummies as well as my two dependent variables in order to account for the influence moat status 
in a given year can have on the following year’s moat status classification. These five lag 
variables are: , , , , and . InagW idel it agNonel it agNarrowl it agReturnl it agAdjReturnl it  
addition, I will briefly comment in my results section on the interaction between my two primary 
moat dummy variables (  and ) and my three control variables ( , ,ideW it oN it arketCapM it BP it  
and ). These six additional variables are as follows:  ,  ,  ,EP it ideMCW it ideP BW it ideP EW it  
 ,  , and . None of the aforementioned economic moat-related studiesoMCN it oP BN it oP EN it  
commented on how moat status may impact these particular control variables. Thus, my 
expectations for these interaction results are ambiguous.  
 
IV.  Data 
Nearly all information included in my dataset is from Morningstar. The investment 
research firm provided all information related to the following variables: economic moat status, 
sector classifications, average annual share prices, annual stock returns, market capitalization, 
price-to-book, price-to-cash flow, and price-to-earnings. Economic moat status is often updated 
on an annual basis by Morningstar, so to assemble moat ratings, I assembled data from the first 
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analyst report of each year. Other variables collected from Morningstar were taken from each 
company’s respective ten-year summary chart of all relevant financial data. Average annual 
percentage returns for the market, meanwhile, was taken from the Kenneth French data library. 
Only one variable -- adjusted return-- was calculated manually by subtracting each company’s 
annual return by the market’s overall annual return in order to gage whether a company 
outperformed the market in a given year.  
My collection of firm data spans from January 2008 to December 2017. This time-frame 
was chosen primarily because Morningstar only provides information for many of the 
aforementioned variables dating back to 2008.  And with respect to economic moat status in 44
particular, Morningstar did not begin to consistently include formal moat classifications until the 
mid-2000’s. However, this ten-year sample period is sufficient enough to test the assumption that 
firms with sustainable competitive advantages make for better long-term investments, 
particularly since this dataset comprises multiple business cycles (i.e. the Great Recession and 
the expansion period following the crisis).  
In all, 170 companies across the technology, consumer defensive, and healthcare sectors 
are included in the dataset, with each one featuring ten annual observations regarding its moat 
status and stock performance data for that particular year. However, an important note with 
respect to the size of the dataset is that I was forced to make a number of decisions regarding 
which companies were included in the final sample. Most notably, a company could not be 
included if Morningstar did not provide an analyst report because economic moat classifications 
can only be accessed through Morningstar’s archives through these analyst reports. For 
44 ​Ratios such as P/B and P/E are also only shown over the past ten years on Morningstar, for example.  
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reference, Morningstar currently provides analyst reports on 1,056 publicly-traded companies, so 
my dataset was immediately trimmed based on this limitation.  Moreover, I also excluded 45
companies that had not been public for at least ten years because investment philosophies that 
emphasize the importance of competitive advantages stress that wide moat companies are a 
superior long-term investment rather than a short one. Thus, even wide moat companies that 
have been public for, say, three years, would not necessarily make for a profitable short-term 
investment according to this theory.  
Summary tables breaking down the distribution of the 1,700 total observations by 
industry and by moat rating can be found below. 
 
Table 1: Sector Breakdown 
Sector # of Comp. # of Obs. Percentage 
Consumer Defensive 40 400  23.53% 
Healthcare 63 630 37.06% 
Technology 67 670 39.41% 
Total 170 1,700 100% 
 
 
 
 
45 ​This will be discussed further in the paper’s section on limitations.  
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Table 2: Moat Breakdown by Sector 
Sector # of Wide Moat 
Obs. 
# of Narrow 
Moat Obs. 
# of No Moat Obs. Total 
Consumer 
Defensive 
163 169 68 400 
Healthcare 228 342 60 630 
Technology 167 360 143 670 
Total 558 (32.82%) 871 (51.2%) 271 (15.9%) 1,700 
Table 1 shows the distribution of companies by sector. Table 2, meanwhile, provides 
additional insight into the moat breakdown by sector. One obvious takeaway is the relative lack 
of no moat firms in the healthcare sector (10%, as a percentage of total healthcare observations), 
as well as the relative abundance of healthcare firms with either wide or narrow moats (35% and 
55%, respectively). The selection of consumer defensive stocks, however, contain the largest 
percentage of wide moat observations relative to the other sectors (40.8% as a percentage of total 
consumer defensive observations), followed by healthcare (36.2%) and technology (24.9%).  
Table 3 offers a summary table of the moat dummy and return data, as well as averages 
for the various control variables. The average yearly unadjusted return among the selected stocks 
was 16.1%, while the average adjusted return was 5.5%. With respect to the former, these yearly 
returns ranged from roughly -88% to 311%.  
Lastly, Table 4 indicates the variation in moat status categories by year.  The narrow 46
moat category comprised the largest segment of the 1,700 observations, although this category 
also experienced a significant amount of variation over the ten-year sample (-22.92% decline in 
46 ​Note: time trend tables for each moat dummy category essentially yielded the same results. For instance, a table 
for WideDummy indicated the same distribution of wide moat observations in the “1” column, while the “0” column 
was simply the sum of all remaining narrow and no moat observations.  
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narrow moat observations from 2008-2017). The wide moat category, however, experienced the 
largest amount of variation, as the 64 observations in 2017 marked a 36.17% increase compared 
to 2008. The no moat category, meanwhile, was the most stable.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
MoatDummy 1,700 .328 .469 0 1 
Annual Return (%) 1,700 .161 .375 -.879 3.11 
Adjusted Return 
(%) 
1,700 .055 .321 -.989 2.82 
Market Cap. ($ 
millions) 
1,700 40,928 68,807 200 906,472 
Price/Book 1,700 6.45 28.00 0 850.79 
Price/Earnings 1,700 28.58 84.17 0 2464.5 
Table 4: Moat Rating by Year 
Year Wide Narrow None Total 
2008 47 96 27 1,700 
2009 48 96 26 1,700 
2010 46 96 28 1,700 
2011 51 91 28 1,700 
2012 53 86 31 1,700 
2013 58 87 25 1,700 
2014 62 83 25 1,700 
2015 64 82 24 1,700 
2016 65 80 25 1,700 
2017 64 74 32 1,700 
Total 558 871 271 1,700 
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V.  Results 
Following the format used by Liu and Mantecon (2016), I will begin by first discussing 
general takeaways from the stock returns of all 170 companies with respect to moat status, as 
well as for each fiscal year and sector, before transitioning to my regression results.  
Do wide moat stocks make for superior investments? Based on the annual returns from 
2008 to 2017 in my dataset, the answer -- surprisingly -- is no. Table 5 presents basic summary 
results for the average unadjusted and adjusted returns for all 1,700 annual observations 
according to their moat rating. Stocks with no moats unexpectedly outperformed the wide moat 
observations by a relatively significant margin, posting higher unadjusted and adjusted returns. 
In turn, the narrow and no moat stocks also combined to outperform wide moat stocks as well.  
Table 5: Unadjusted and Adjusted Returns by Moat (2008-2017)  
 Wide Narrow None  Wide Non-Wide 
Average Annual 
Return 
(Unadjusted) 
12.97% 16.97% 19.84%  13.45% 17.65% 
Average Annual 
Return (Adjusted) 
2.05% 6.78% 9.08%  2.05% 7.20% 
Observations 558 871 271  558 1142 
Similarly surprising results were also found based on the yearly and sector breakdowns. 
Table 6 shows that non-wide moat stocks outperformed the wide moat stocks in seven of the ten 
observation years. And whereas non-wide moat stocks underperformed the broader market on 
only one occasion (2016), wide moat stocks lagged the market three times (2010, 2013, and 
2016). As for how the success of wide moat firms varied by sector, these seemingly 
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well-positioned companies once again failed to post higher unadjusted and adjusted annual 
returns than their narrow and no moat counterparts (see Table 7).  
Table 6: Adjusted Annual Returns 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Wide 14.8% 2.3% -8.0% 12.9% 1.4% -6.0% 4.2% 8.2% -10.7% 2.1% 
Non-
Wide 
5.5% 31.7% 7.9% 0.3% 0.9% 6.0% 10.2% 8.9% -3.7% 3.2% 
 
Table 7: Returns by Sector (2008 - 2017) 
 Wide Narrow None 
Technology 
(Unadjusted) 
16.71% 18.58% 23.26% 
Technology 
(Adjusted) 
5.80% 8.14% 13.07% 
Observations 167 360 143 
Consumer Defensive 
(Unadjusted) 
11.38% 14.79% 14.59% 
Consumer Defensive 
(Adjusted) 
-0.26% 5.43% 3.38% 
Observations 163 169 68 
Healthcare 
(Unadjusted) 
11.37% 16.35% 17.63% 
Healthecare 
(Adjusted) 
0.72% 6.01% 6.05% 
Observations 228 342 60 
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What stands out the most about these results, however, is how similarly they relate to the 
results found by Liu and Mantecon (2016). Table 8 indicates this resemblance, as wide moat 
stocks were also found to be the worst-performing moat category in their eight-year sample 
period from 2003 to 2011. This was true on both an adjusted and unadjusted basis.  In addition, 47
the no moat portfolio also posted the highest average annual returns with unadjusted and adjusted 
percentage totals north of 20% and 10% respectively. The no moat grouping was also followed 
by the narrow moat stocks, whose returns were relatively lower compared to my sample, but 
similarly outperformed wide moat stocks relatively comfortably.  
Table 8: Return Comparison  
       ​Manditch (2018)      ​Liu and Mantecon (2016) 
 Wide Narrow None Wide Narrow None 
Average 
Annual Return 
(Unadjusted) 
12.97% 16.97% 19.84% 11.2% 14.4% 21.3% 
Average 
Annual Return 
(Unadjusted) 
2.05% 6.78% 9.08% 1.6% 4.8% 11.6% 
 
With these initial results in mind, I will turn now to my regression models.  Using robust 48
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity,  was found to be negatively related toideW it  
both  and  relative to the model’s narrow moat benchmark variable,eturnR it djustedReturnA it  
47 ​For the record, Liu and Mantecon (2016) used slightly different terminology for these terms, as they referred to 
unadjusted annual returns as “raw return” and adjusted returns as “market-adjusted returns.” However, both sets of 
terms are interchangeable, as they simply subtracted the benchmark return for the market in a given year by the 
company-specific return, like I also did.  
48 ​The results can be found in Table 9.  
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while  was found to be positively related to each return variable.   The results for the wideoN it  
49
moat variable were undoubtedly more noteworthy, though, because each coefficient was 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In other words, it can be stated with confidence that if a 
company in my selected sample received an upgrade to wide moat status, its annual return would 
be expected to decrease by an average of 5.15%. The coefficients for  , meanwhile, were notoN it  
statistically significant. Furthermore, all three control variables yielded positive coefficients, 
with  and  reporting results that were statistically significant. These results were inEP it BP it  
accord with my expectations for these signs.  
Table 9: Return and Adjusted Return Results 
 
49 ​Reminder: the model’s benchmark variable is the narrow moat dummy since it was naturally omitted from the 
regression results due to collinearity.  
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However, the sign of the reported coefficients for  and  contrasted with bothideW it oN it  
of my hypotheses. But since I previously acknowledged the possibility for unexpected signs 
based on the empirical findings presented by Liu and Mantecon (2016), it appears my findings 
simply add more credibility to the aforementioned paper that did not find support for wide moat 
observations after including companies classified under each of the three moat categories.  And 50
whereas Liu and Mantecon did not report a statistically significant coefficient for their wide moat 
dummy variable, my study found a significant negative relationship at the 5% level. Taken 
together with the unadjusted and adjusted return results discussed at the beginning of this 
section, I have once again found little support in favor of wide moat stocks.  
Table 10 shows the results for my sector-level regressions. The healthcare moat status 
variable yielded the most noteworthy result, as  was found to have a relatively largeideW it  
negative relationship with  that was statistically significant (p-value = 0.054) relative toeturnR it  
the narrow moat benchmark. Combined with how the coefficient for  was also higher thanoN it  
the result for , these results suggest that wide moat healthcare stocks clearly would not beideW it  
expected to post higher returns than their non-wide moat counterparts, which is the exact 
opposite of what I hypothesized. Future research should undoubtedly explore whether there is a 
particular trend in the healthcare sector that may have driven these results. But based on 
anecdotal evidence from companies in my dataset, it appears that patents seem to be a key 
influence. For example, Allergan, a drug manufacturer, experienced 60.20% adjusted growth in 
2013 as a non-wide moat firm after acquiring a number of small pharmaceutical companies that 
each had extended patent licenses on their niche products (Waterhouse, 2013).  
50 ​Recall that economic moat studies such as Kanuri and McLeod (2016), in contrast, only analyzed the performance 
of wide moat stocks.  
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As for the technology and consumer defensive sector regressions, the former did not yield 
a noteworthy coefficient nor a statistically significant p-value for . This result was notideW it  
completely unexpected, however, as I theorized that since wide moat status may be more 
difficult to maintain in a sector where companies must continuously produce innovate products 
that -- even if successful -- may lose relevance relatively quickly, annual returns with respect to 
moat status would be the lowest among the three sectors. Though this did not turn out to be true, 
the coefficient still indicates that possessing a wide moat does not necessarily lead to strong 
stock performance in the technology sector. Additionally, this argument is supported by the 
coefficient for  which -- although not statistically significant -- yielded a high magnitude ofoN it  
0.088 suggesting that the selected no moat companies in my sample were particularly profitable 
relative to the narrow moat benchmark. The consumer defensive regression results, meanwhile, 
were unremarkable: in short, neither the magnitude of the coefficients for  and  norideW it oN it  
the respective p-values were noteworthy with respect to moat status.   51
 
 
 
 
 
51 ​It is worth mentioning that the results for the three control variables were similar to the results for these variables 
in the primary hypotheses. The only exception, however, was that the price/book variable was found to have a small 
negative relationship with average annual returns in the consumer defensive sector.  
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Table 10: Sector Regression Results 
 
Results for the industry regressions can be found in Tables 14, 15, & 16 in the Appendix. 
Results for three of the nine industries -- biotechnology, household & personal products, and 
information technology -- yielded  coefficients that positively related to . In fact,ideW it eturnR it  
the magnitudes for each of the coefficients were noteworthy: the biotechnology regression, for 
instance, resulted in a coefficient of 0.226, suggesting that an upgrade from non-wide to wide 
moat status led to a 22.6% increase in returns. The moat status variable for the information 
technology regression had a similar coefficient (0.212). For household & personal products, 
meanwhile, while the coefficient was relatively smaller (0.109), the p-value was the closest to 
being statistically significant (p-value = 0.119), indicating that there is empirical evidence to 
48 
nearly say with confidence that wide moat status mattered in this industry over the ten-year 
sample period.  
Six of the other nine industries, in contrast, yielded negative coefficients with respect to 
. Although none of these results were statistically significant, the magnitudes of a few ofideW it  
these relationships were noteworthy. For instance, two industries within the healthcare sector -- 
healthcare plans and medical instruments -- reported negative coefficients of -0.119 and -0.140 
respectively.  
Many other industries delivered noteworthy results for their respective no moat dummy 
variable as well. While the biotechnology industry reported a coefficient of 0.226 for ,ideW it  
this industry’s coefficient for  yielded an even greater positive relationship (0.530) that wasoN it  
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that wide moat biotechnology companies did 
not necessarily make for a superior investment. A few other industries also reported positive 
relationships between  and  relative to the narrow moat benchmark: healthcareoN it eturnR it  
plans, for instance, yielded a coefficient of 0.166, while semiconductors reported a coefficient of 
0.260, each of which were greater than the results for their respective industry’s wide moat 
variable. Furthermore, a few other industries also reported statistically significant results, such as 
drug manufacturing, alcoholic beverages, and information technology. Given that each of these 
three  coefficients were smaller than each industry’s respective  result, however, it isoN it ideW it  
reasonable to say that wide moat firms in these industries made for better investments during my 
selected time-frame.  
Lastly, I will briefly discuss the results for my lag and interaction variables, both of 
which can be found in Tables 17 & 18 in the Appendix. Introducing lag variables in order to 
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account for autocorrelation, particularly among my model’s moat status classifications, did not 
influence the results. In fact,  and  essentially yielded the same coefficientsagW idel it agNol it  
and p-values as my primary regression results in Table 9. The interaction regressions, which 
attempted to gauge whether moat status had an additional impact on my three control variables, 
yielded only one statistically significant result, as  was found to be positively related tooP BN it  
 at the 1% level, suggesting that a marginal increase in average annual return led to aeturnR it  
6.1% increase in the interaction between no moat stocks and their respective price/book ratios. In 
addition to not reporting any other significant results for the interaction variables, though, it is 
worth mentioning that the magnitudes of each of these variables were miniscule, as coefficients 
for variables such as  and  were roughly zero. Furthermore, the coefficientsideP BW it ideP EW it  
for the two moat status variables were different than the moat dummy coefficients in the my two 
primary regression models. While a negative coefficient was once again reported for , thisideW it  
value was now statistically significant at the 1% level.  , meanwhile, yielded a dramaticallyoN it  
different result, as the coefficient was found to be negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Research dedicated to specifically analyzing interactions between moat status and various 
control variables in more detail would likely add further insight to these relationships and 
possibly explain why different values were reported for my two moat status dummy variables.  
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VI.  Discussion 
Nonetheless, nearly all results discussed in the previous section lead to this conclusion: 
stocks deemed to have wide economic moats do not necessarily make for superior investments. I 
rejected my hypothesis that wide moat stocks would outperform non-wide moat stocks based on 
a variety of information, such as the differences in adjusted and unadjusted annual returns among 
each moat classification and, most notably, the regression results that did not provide empirical 
support for my hypothesis. Thus, my findings dispute the conclusions reached by authors such as 
Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005), each of whom advocated strongly in favor of wide 
moat stocks. However, since their studies only looked specifically at whether wide moat firms 
outperformed the market over their given sample periods, their results are not as convincing as 
those provided by Liu and Mantecon (2016) due to their exclusion of narrow and no moat stocks 
from their analysis.  
My results, therefore, relate most strongly to the aforementioned paper that also found 
insubstantial support for wide moat stocks. I will now explain why this was the case. For starters, 
it is worth mentioning the limitations of my study in terms of how it may have influenced these 
particular results. As mentioned briefly in Section IV, I was forced to make numerous 
qualifications with respect to my data. The only way I could collect data on Morningstar’s 
economic moat ratings was to first segment companies through the firm’s premium stock 
screener. While Morningstar currently assigns moat ratings for roughly 17,000 publicly-traded 
companies, it is impossible to access a company’s moat rating history​ ​unless Morningstar 
provides an official analyst report for said company. Due to practical constraints, Morningstar’s 
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analysts only currently cover 1,002 specific companies based largely on investor demand.  And 52
since I only observed companies that had been public since 2008 in order to assess the 
performance of selected companies over as long of a time-frame as possible, while also focusing 
on companies in three particular industries that fit this criteria, my dataset features both a 
relatively small sample size as well as a selection bias.  
Another limitation is that my study does not account for the possibility of 
reverse-causality, or endogeneity. This limitation will be discussed further in the following 
section, but my study could have accounted for this potential issue by conducting an event study 
that compared differences in actual and predicted returns following a moat status change. Ideally, 
I would also want annual observations over an even longer time period so as to assess whether 
the importance of economic moat status has varied across time. But since most of Morningstar’s 
financial data dates back only ten years, this also was not feasible for my study.  
As for why I came to my particular conclusions, I will first refer back to the 
efficient-market hypothesis. Though Fama’s theory regarding how it is impossible to consistently 
generate superior returns relative to the market is debatable, the notion that all relevant and 
available information is already priced into the market, which therefore decreases the probability 
of consistently finding profitable investing opportunities, is likely a factor in explaining why 
moat status was not positively correlated with annual returns. For instance, it is hardly a secret 
that a wide moat company such as Coca-Cola possesses premier brand and scale advantages. It is 
also reasonable to infer that wide moat companies are more popular among both institutional and 
casual investors. Significant awareness of a company like Coca-Cola’s advantages, therefore, 
52 ​More specifically, Morningstar applies a formal research coverage selection method that involves factoring in a 
company’s relevance to client’s interests and permanence (i.e. the likelihood a covered company remains relevant 
for five or more years).  
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may raise expectations for the stock and, in turn, lower its potential to achieve extraordinary 
stock growth. This dynamic has even been explored in the literature by the likes of Richardson et 
al. (2012). The authors found that while investor recognition related positively to stock 
performance over longer time horizons, stocks in the authors’ high-investor-recognition portfolio 
had lower average annual returns (6.27%) than low-investor-recognition stocks (9.20%) over 
their selected three-year sample periods.  
Another driver of these results is the volatility differences between wide and non-wide 
moat stocks. Table 11 shows a chart of both the 10 highest and 10 lowest adjusted annual returns 
among the 1,700 observations. One notable takeaway stands out: there are no wide moat 
companies listed in either table. In fact, if we were to expand this table to include the top 50 
highest adjusted annual return observations, wide moat stocks would comprise only 3​ ​of the 50 
data points. No moat stocks, on the other hand, accounted for 6 of the top 7 highest adjusted 
returns, with companies such as Seagate Technology posting adjusted annual returns over 250%!  
In short, wide moat stocks are clearly more stable than non-wide moat stocks, while the 
latter are more volatile and therefore more likely to earn extremely high returns.  Interestingly 53
enough, many of the noteworthy non-wide observations also tended to be rather small. Despite 
nearly 66% of the dataset featuring large-cap stocks, for example, 12 of the 20 non-wide 
observations referenced in Table 11 were either mid or small-cap stocks. This observation relates 
to a discussion topic in Liu and Mantecon (2016) concerning evidence that wide moat firms tend 
to be large growth stocks, while non-wide moat stocks tend to be small value stocks. Referring 
back to Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Fama and French (1995), large growth stocks have been 
53 ​The variance for the adjusted returns of wide moat stocks in my dataset, for the record, was 4.28%. The variance 
for non-wide moat stocks, in contrast, was 13.18%.  
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found to post lower returns than small value stocks. It appears that a similar trend could be at 
play with my results, as a popularity bias could exist that hinders the returns of wide moat firms, 
while less popular companies deemed by a firm like Morningstar to be a risky investment may be 
overlooked. Investors, in turn, may miss opportunities to gain stellar returns.  
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Table 11: Volatility of Adjusted Annual Returns  
Highest Observations Lowest Observations 
Company (Year) Adjusted 
Annual 
Return (%) 
Moat Status Company 
(Year) 
Adjusted 
Annual 
Return (%) 
Moat Status 
1. Seagate 
Technology 
(2009) 
282.24% None 1. Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2016) 
 
-98.94% Narrow 
2. Micron 
Technology 
(2009) 
264.13% None 2. Endo 
International 
(2016) 
-86.32% None 
3. Infineon 
(2009) 
263.81% None 3. Blackberry 
(2011) 
-76.03% None 
4. Western 
Digital Corp 
(2009) 
256.54% None 4. Myriad 
Genetics (2016) 
-74.60% Narrow 
5. Nvidia (2016) 212.10% Narrow 5. Endo 
International 
(2017) 
-74.15% None 
6. Micron 
Technology 
(2013) 
207.91% None 6. Blackberry 
(2013) 
-72.47% None 
7. Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2012) 
192.61% None 7. SINA Corp 
(2014) 
-66.95% Narrow 
8. Baidu (2009) 185.90% Narrow 8. Teva 
Pharmaceutical 
(2017) 
-66.59% None 
9. Marvell 
Technology 
(2009)  
182.04% Narrow 9. Marvell 
Technology 
(2012) 
-62.29% Narrow 
10. Skyworks 
Solutions (2015) 
156.01% None 10. Edward 
Lifesciences 
(2013) 
-62.22% Narrow 
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VII.  Conclusion 
Further research opportunities abound within the economic moat literature. First, future 
studies should analyze larger datasets. Not only was my study limited with respect to my total 
number of observations, but even studies such as Kanuri and McLeod (2016) and Boyd (2005) 
contained fewer than 150 companies in their annual portfolios. Additionally, a continued 
emphasis on whether moats are more impactful in certain sectors rather than others would be 
beneficial. This study examined the relationship between competitive advantage and stock 
performance while specifically looking at companies within three particular sectors. But a future 
study should include companies from a variety of other sectors, such as financial services and 
energy. Further interest in industry-specific relationships between moat status and stock returns 
would complement these sector-related studies as well.  
Moreover, future economic moat research should attempt to conduct event-related 
studies, such as the paper published by Kruger (2015), in order to account for possible 
endogeneity. Though a method to determine what exactly constitutes as a moat-related event has 
yet to be accepted in the literature, a news-based study examining how competitive advantage 
effects short-term stock performance would successfully account for this shortcoming. 
Additionally, authors have yet to explore how drivers of moat status effect stock performance. In 
other words, is it more beneficial to possess, say, a superior brand identity or, rather, an 
unmatched cost advantage? Also, might companies with multiple​ ​advantages post even greater 
stock returns than companies with simply one competitive edge? This type of study could also 
examine whether specific drivers of sustainable competitive advantage are more desirable in 
certain industries rather than others.  
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Nonetheless, my thesis provides an initial assessment of how the performance of stocks 
based on moat status varies across three sectors and nine industries. And as to the answer of my 
study’s research question, the prevalence of negative and statistically significant coefficients for 
my wide moat dummy variable, as well as the surprising disparities between the average returns 
of wide and non-wide moat portfolios over the ten-year sample period, certainly does not provide 
resounding support for wide moat stocks being vastly superior to other investments. These 
results even infer that it may be smarter to turn investing attention ​away ​from companies deemed 
to have sustainable competitive advantages.  
Does this mean that investors such as Buffett are wrong as to the importance of economic 
moats? No, not exactly. After all, the selected wide moat stocks in my study still narrowly 
outperformed the market, as seen in Table 5. Wide moat stocks also appear to be far more stable, 
and thus potentially make for a more desired investment during harsher economic conditions 
based on how the selected companies in my sample outperformed the market during the three 
years (2008, 2011, and 2015) in which overall market returns were negative (see Table 6).  
It seems, however, that economic moats are more important from a financial perspective 
(i.e. in terms of whether a company can consistently earn profits) rather than an investment 
perspective. Aforementioned studies by Porter (1980, 1985), Barney (1991), and Newbert (2008) 
support this argument. Morningstar, however, seems to lend the impression that all wide moat 
stocks will make for worthwhile investments. This is not necessarily incorrect, as evidenced by 
the performance of wide moat companies included in my dataset such as Intuit. The software 
application firm known for producing software such as TurboTax maintained a wide moat rating 
throughout all ten years of my study and achieved strong, consistent growth: the company’s 
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share price increased by an average of 11.21% per year. Yet while some other selected wide 
moat companies performed similarly to Intuit, there were wide moat examples such as 
AstraZeneca, a drug manufacturer, which also maintained its wide moat status throughout all ten 
years but only experienced mediocre annual returns relative to the market (5.71% annual 
growth). Even a famous wide moat company like Coca-Cola performed modestly during this 
time-frame, growing far below the overall pace of the market at an annual rate of 4.31%. 
Thus, investors can come away with plenty of applicable information based on the results 
of this study. Companies with sustainable competitive advantages surprisingly may not make for 
a superior stock investment. But by understanding the historical performance of companies based 
on economic moat status across various sectors and industries, the path toward finding assets that 
yield extraordinarily high returns will become clearer.  
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VIII. Appendix 
Table 12: Morningstar Moat Rating Process 
Source: Morningstar Indexes Yearbook  
 
 
Table 13: Industries Included in Industry-Specific Regression Models  
Consumer Defensive Healthcare Technology 
Alcoholic Beverages  Biotechnology  Information Technology 
Household & Personal Products Drug Manufacturers  Semiconductors 
 Health Care Plans Software 
 Medical Instruments  
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Table 14: Industry Results -- Healthcare Sector 
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Table 15: Industry Results -- Consumer Defensive 
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Table 16: Industry Results -- Technology 
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Table 17: Lag Regression Results  
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Table 18: Interaction Results 
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